Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect

Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 183 (2015) 115 – 121

Procedia
Social and Behavioral Sciences

International Workshop on Ideologies, Values and Political Behaviors in Central and Eastern Europe

Constructing the Migration-(In)Security Nexus. Aspects of Urban Geopolitics

Adrian Cosmin Basarabă[a]*, Maria-Mihaela Nistor [b]

[a]*Faculty of Political Sciences, Philosophy and Communicational Sciences, West University of Timisoara, Parvan Bvd., No. 4, Timisoara, 300223, Romania*

[b]*Doctoral School of International Relations and Security Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, M. Kogălniceanu Street, No. 1, Cluj-Napoca, 400084, Romania*

Abstract

This article analyses the dynamics of the urban geopolitics within the wider framework of permanently constructing the (more or less imagined) migration-(in)security nexus, which might have, at turn, its boomerang effects, leading to further security dilemmas. The role of immigrant networks is briefly sketched and then considered within the constructivist paradigm. Last, but not least, the case study illustrates the representational asymmetric interplay between the global network of Islamists and the urban one of PEGIDA.

Peer review under the responsibility of the West University of Timisoara.

Keywords: migration-(in)security nexus, urbanization, transnational networks, PEGIDA.

1. Introduction

Motto: "Power relations are rooted in the system of social networks." (Foucault, 1982)

"The most immediate source of self-recognition and autonomous organization is locality" (Castells, 2010). This locality can no longer be thoroughly homogenous in this age of movement and metamorphosis. "Thus, so emerged the [apparent] paradox of increasingly local politics in a world structured by increasingly global processes"

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +40 723 892 584.
E-mail address: adrian.basaraba@e-uvt.ro

Peer review under the responsibility of the West University of Timisoara.
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.04.853

(Castells, 2010). And the main local targets for potential immigrants are the urban ones, primarily due to economic reasons.

More than a mere topos, the urban space has become a modus vivendi, an embodiment of the (post)modern world, sometimes even a world in miniature, a space where diversity meets diversity, a metaphor of the so-called glocalization: "[t]he city, the contemporary metropolis, is for many the chosen metaphor for the experience of the modern world. In its everyday details, its mixed histories, languages and cultures, its elaborate evidence of global tendencies and local distinctions, the figure of the city, as both a real and an imaginary place, apparently provides a ready map for reading, interpretation and comprehension" (Chambers, 2001).

Without entering the domain of urban studies too much, some aspects of urbanization connected to actual migration patterns need to be sketched for the comprehension of the migration-(in)security nexus, considering the fact that migration happens, above all, in cities and not in the remote rural areas.

2. Considerations on Urban Geopolitics

Since Antiquity, the city –with its various names, be it a polis in Greece or an urbe in the Roman empire, moving on to the Italian communes of the Middle Ages- has represented a key spatial element for trade, having, in time, a spillover effect on other plans, leading up to what Saskia Sassen has called 'the global city'. Significantly surpassing their initially economic role, cities have become "political, economic and social agents" (Giddens, 2009).

Max Weber's posthumously published City analyses the urban environment from various perspectives, be they socio-economic, political, religious or administrative. Whereas, socially, a city can be characterized by anonymity, economically, "a city is always a market centre" (Weber, 1922). Worth emphasizing is Weber's consideration of the city as "political community" (Weber, 1922), a key feature of the Western society - even that of Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The political community characteristic of the city is what Ferdinand Tönnies names Gemeinschaft – German translation for 'community'. Still, according to Tönnies, this Gemeinschaft- key feature of traditions, personal relations and feelings of neighbourhood, of belonging- has gradually been replaced by Gesellschaft- the German translation for 'society'- the latter being based not on feelings of belonging, but on a rather instrumental association (Giddens, 2009), precisely because of this anonymity the urban environment offers as compared to the rural one. I argue that sometimes a Gesellschaft might embody various Gemeinschaften and, ultimately, turn into one, considering, of course, various vectors, among which the size is a crucial one. Megacities are not as likely to become a Gemeinschaft as cities of, for example, 300,000 inhabitants.

More than half of world's population – in 2014, 54%, according to UN statistics (UN, 2014) - lives in urban areas and Homi Bhabha's 'third space' is essentially a metropolitan one. Furthermore, there is a proven tendency for the dynamics of urbanization to be perpetually augmented. Hence, the connection between migration and urbanization is worth considering.

According to recent projections, "the world's urban population is expected to double in the next 50 years, as developing countries reach levels of urban population- from 60 to 70 percent- that, until recently, were seen only in the rich world. Already, many of the world's largest cities – Mumbai, Cairo, Calcutta, Jakarta, Lagos, Manila – are found in the world's poorest countries" (Goldstone, 2012). On the other hand, in richer countries, various measures have been considered so as to avoid the gradual emptiness of rural areas; some governments have adopted policies to encourage immigrants to opt for villages and not cities, by financially stimulating them to sustain local development in non-urban regions, such as the Provincial Nominees Program in Canada.

To these, the role of urban movements, analysed by Manuel Castells, has added a considerable amount of power, at least to the collective memory of the city. Furthermore, "urban movements and their discourses, actors and organizations have been integrated into the structure and practice of local government", aspect which "has considerably reinforced [it] and introduced the possibility of the local state as a significant instance of reconstruction of political control and social meaning" (Castells, 2010). Even if the fundamental role of cities is widely acknowledged and "it is admitted that cities can and have to play a significant role in solving international political, economic and social problems" (Giddens, 2009), various debates arise that question its role and powers. A relevant example in this respect is Canada's largest city, Toronto, which has approximately 2.8 million inhabitants (Toronto Facts). According to recent data, 15% of them – approximately 380,000 people – are permanent residents, which means they pay their local taxes and benefit from local services, but are not permitted to vote for local elections,

since they are not granted Canadian citizenship. According to Canadian law, permanent residents must have lived in Canada for at least three years before applying for Canadian citizenship, which might be, in turn, a relatively lengthy process (still short as compared to countries such as Switzerland, for instance). Given that "resident non-citizens can vote in municipal elections in some cities in more than 40 countries – including countries in Europe, as well as the U.S. and New Zealand" (Mah, 2013), much lobby has been done for the adoption of this right of a so-called 'urban citizenship'. One could consider such actions as a re-construction of the Ancient city-state: "[t]he reinvention of the city-state is a salient characteristic of this new age of globalization, as it was related to the rise of a trading, international economy at the origin of the modern age" (Castells, 2010).

Or, as Saskia Sassen has observed, one could talk about "an emerging urban geopolitics centered in networks of cities - mostly, but not exclusively, global cities. Major cities will not replace any of the other geopolitical actors. But they will play a role, both as actor and as the site for major challenges" (Sassen, 2012).

In this age of high speed and rapid movement, "within global cities, a geography of 'centrality and marginality' is being [re]configured. Alongside with exuberant richness, there is an acute poverty. Still, even if these two worlds coexist, the real contact between them can be surprisingly reduced" (Giddens, 2009).

Analyzing the demographic maps of various metropoles, one can notice that immigrants usually life at the outskirts, where they even have, in some cases, their own embodiments of communities, such as Chinatowns and various 'villages', regularly named after their pre-migratory nationality. Furthermore, as Hawley underlines, "the zones that are formed in urban areas develop not just as a consequence of spatial relations, but also of the temporal ones. […] The temporary order of people's daily life reflects the hierarchy of the city's districts and wards" (Hawley cited in Giddens, 2009). Still, this hierarchy determined by temporary order, has sometimes been significantly distorted by the so-called 'newcomers', as was the case in many colonized regions.

Some immigrants are being ghettoized at the suburbs: "as suburbia grows and diversifies, the impact of suburban exclusion widens. The increasing heterogeneity of suburbia means that more and more suburbanities as well as city dwellers are affected by local policies which limit access to the growth of the metropolis" (Danielson, 1976). This might further lead to segregation in the detriment of integration, causing further imagined enmities that shall be analyzed in this article.

3. Constructing the Migration-(In)Security Nexus

The migration-(in)security nexus is from the very beginning a highly controversial one. Whereas some researchers state that there is no connection between the two components – to this category belonging, as well, various leaders of migrants' think-tanks – others do claim the existence a consequential relationship between migration and security. To exemplify, whereas Thomas Faist states that "the links between international migration and security threats are inconclusive even after 9/11. Migration and security only superficially share the fact that border crossings are involved" (Faist, 2004) and Ratna Omidvar considers the very association of the two terms as highly discriminatory for immigrants, in the working paper "International Migration as a Non-Traditional Security Threat and the EU Response to this Phenomenon", Anna Kicinger states that international migration might "threaten" social stability, demographic security, cultural identity, the social security system and welfare state philosophy, as well as internal security, primarily in terms of organized crime (Kicinger, 2004). It is also acknowledged that "the fight against all forms of irregular migration through various measures will remain the core of EU engagement" (Kicinger, 2004). There are also scholars who tend to favour the in-between position: "[u]sually, both things are true: members of some disadvantaged minority groups are disproportionately involved in kinds of crimes that result in convictions and prison sentences and the consequences of those differences are exacerbated by stereotyping and differential treatment" (Torny, 2014). Further examples shall be detailed in the two case studies. In all cases, "despite its organizational diversity, the inviolable symbolic unity of the state is invoked to justify the use of organized force against 'enemies' within and without its boundaries" (Finlayson & Martin, 2008), this being paralleled to Thomas Faist's assumption on the meta-politics involved in this game of power towards rather imagined enemies.

"Enemies are representations of the Other as actor that (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as autonomous human being and, consequently, (2) will not voluntarily limit violence"(Wendt, 2011). As emphasized

by Wendt, not all enemies representations are legitimate. But it is not legitimacy that matters in representational issues: "reality or imagination, if actors do believe that enemies are real, then they are real in terms of consequences" (Thomas & Thomas cited in Wendt, 2011). At a certain point, "actors start treating enmity as a property of the system rather than one of individual actors and feel themselves obliged to represent all the Others as enemies, simply because they are part of the system. This way, a specific Other becomes what Mead has called a 'generalized Other', a structure of collective expectations that persist in time, even if individual actors come and go; it is within this logic that new actors will be socialized" (Wendt, 2011).

Another parallel can be drawn to the principle of "reflected evaluations" or "mirroring", as explained by Alexander Wendt. This generates the hypothesis according to which actors perceive themselves as they believe the Others evaluate them, in the mirror of the Others' representations about Themselves" (Wendt, 2011). "Constructivism underlines that the ideas of Ego about Alter, be they right or wrong, are not only passive perceptions about something that exists independently of Ego, but also on something that actively and continuously participates in constructing Alter's role towards Ego" (Wendt, 2011). This might bear far-reaching implications on the effects of scapegoating immigrants.

4. The Power of Networks

Some immigrant-welcoming countries are believed to have indirectly nurtured terrorism by encouraging transnational immigration. This way, certain categories of immigrants' remittances have contributed to the creation of weapons and to the facilitation of organized crime (Bell, 2007). This was primarily done by developing transnational networks, whose evolution is speeded up by globalization.

With far-reaching implications for the migration-(in)security nexus is the 'network society', theorized by Manuel Castells. "For [Manuel] Castells, information and the rapidly changing information technology represent a unifying thread that connects the many globalization processes that happen in the contemporary world" (Jones, 2011). Among the criticism brought to the metaphor of 'network', it has been observed that "a poststructuralist critic could notice that relationing should find its place among Castells' conception on the network-enterprise, network-organization and social movements" (Jones, 2011), since "the concept of network suggests a greater separation of its nodes and fluxes" (Jones, 2011).

Manuel Castells considers that "the network connects localities, at it also connects places that become symbolic sites of events and counter-events. The networking is both face-to-face and electronic" (Castells, 2010). The physical space is transcended by means of internet, so networks are not necessary geographically delimited from one another, since "e-mailing lists, chat rooms, forums and the posting of information and statements made the internet a permanent agora" (Castells, 2010). To synthetize, the network can even be considered a microcosm that requires attentive management and an in-depth analysis of its components and the multi-level connections that exist at both intra- and internetwork levels.

Transnational networks are linked by the feeling of belonging, forming transnational communities that may permanently tighten themselves, despite being spread all over the world. Should these communities be represented as a potential danger for the positive development urban geopolitics, as a threatening "Other", other communities might contextually tighten themselves – being, as Thomas Faist has stated, more or less engaged in metapolitics – so as to diminish or even annihilate the potential danger, having a boomerang effect on the migration-(in)security nexus and, ultimately, leading to further security dilemmas.

5. Case Study: the urban geopolitics of constructing the migration-(in)security nexus in Dresden

The fact that some West-European Muslims are temporarily going back to their home societies to get radicalized is not new. What is striking is the rising frequency of such actions. "In 2013, France counted about 13,000 Salafists in its Muslim population, Germany around 4,500. And in the UK, the numbers are growing by the day. For jihadi recruiters and those working to spread the Salafist and other extremist messages, the war in Syria provides a perfect narrative, the connection they exploit to reach out to and radicalize Western Muslim youth even in their homelands – whether they actually go fight or not" (Esman, 2014). This has further led to a revival and consolidation of right-

extremist movements in European countries and the results in favour of these parties at the May 2014 elections for the European Parliament are a living proof in this respect.

According to 2013 official estimations (Bevölkerung - Entwicklung der Einwohnerzahl), there are 80.77 million persons living in Germany, out of which 4.25 million Muslims (Fakten zum Thema). Sometimes a transfer of image is created from Islam to Islamism and all Muslims are imagined potential enemies of the Western culture. Huntington's statement that "the Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is notable among the Muslims in Europe" (Huntington, 2011) is a proof in this respect.

This is one of the main reasons for the permanent need for distinction between Islam and Islamism: "Islam, a religion, cannot be turned into a handmaiden of politics; when this occurs, Islam is turned into Islamism. Its defining characteristic is its intolerance of others, including Muslims, and glorification of violence against all who disagree" (Mansur, 2013). Or, according to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), "Islamism is the misuse of Islam for the political purposes of Islamists". As revealed by the data of the above-mentioned Office, at the end of 2013 there were 30 active Islamist organizations and the "Islamist potential" acknowledged so far has considerably grown from 38,080 in 2011 to 42,550 in 2012 and even to 43,190 in 2013. This means a rapid evolution of the Islamist network or, more precisely, community in Germany.

To these more or less imagined threats, Germans themselves have not remained passive, this leading, as previously stated in the theoretical part of this article, to the boomerang effect and, further on, to security dilemmas that would further construct the migration-(in)security nexus. This are primarily oriented towards annihilating potential threats and preserving the security of the urban geopolitics.

A relevant example in this respect is constituted by the protests in Dresden that led to the formation of PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes in original), Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West.

It must be emphasized that Dresden is relatively small city, which had at the end of 2013 535,810 inhabitants[†], representing approximately 15% of Berlin's population. Dresden, capital city of Saxony, has approximately 0.1% Muslims (Dearden, 2014). PEGIDA was formed in October 2014 and its members and supporters protested every Monday on the streets against Islamism. Worth underlining is that the founder of PEGIDA, who managed to mobilize people especially on-line, is himself a controversial figure. Lutz Bachmann, a former cook, had been imprisoned for robbery for approximately three years and also accused of drug trafficking[‡].

PEGIDA organizers managed to gather on the streets – according to the information note of the Dresden Police dated December 22nd 2014 - "approximately 17500 people". Having in view the fact that there are relatively few Muslims in Saxony and in other former German Democratic Republic provinces and that this mobilization was before the Charlie Hebdo attack, these impressive number represent the embodiment of constructing a migration-security nexus and of civil engagement in what Thomas Faist called 'metapolitics'.

After Charlie Hebdo attacks, the protests augmented, as expected, leading to 25,000 people marching on the streets of Dresden on January 12th 2015 (BBC, 2015). At the same time, the boomerang effect became noticeable as the civil society started a series of counter-protests, leading to the further division of the Germans: in Dresden the 25,000 protesters met 8,700 counter-protesters (Die Zeit, 2015) who pleaded for tolerance. On the other side, apparently paradoxically, in München, where-, the number of Muslims is round 100,000, representing a percentage much greater than the one in Dresden - the PEGIDA protesters were approximately 1,500, whereas the counter-protesters were estimated by Die Zeit reporters to 18,000.

[†] *Statistik in Dresden*, http://statistik-dresden.de/archives/tag/einwohner.

[‡] "Der vorbestrafte Kopf von PEGIDA", in *tagesschau.de*, 15.12.2014, http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/lutz-bachmann-101.html.

6. Conclusion

In the wider context of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the fear of terrorism has considerably augmented. Analysing these actions in progress for the time being, it can be observed that, beside the represented conflict and its inherent protests of segments of the German population against Islamism and radicalization, a further division of "camps" appears. Hence, the German civil society is itself segregated into PEGIDA protesters and counter-protesters or, even more generically, into two ideologically divided (imagined) communities, to use the concept of Ferdinand Tönnies.

Furthermore, the hypothesis of Manuel Castells that urban movements have considerably reinforced the local state as an "instance of political control and social meaning" is confirmed once more. At the same time, this 'local state', is subject to changing geopolitics and might lead to further tensions between a community of an Ego and that of an Alter, as it has been emphasized in the case study under discussion.

The power of networks can be underlined in case of the Islamists that inoculate fear in the Western society, focusing on terrorism, Germany being no exception here, as well as in that of the civil society that reacts and counter-reacts to these more or less imagined threats by being further divided.

Whereas Islamists belong to a wider transnational, even global network, PEGIDA can be considered an example of urban network rapidly risen out of perceptions and representations related to the wider migration-(in)security nexus, leading to various security dilemmas within the German society and not only.

References

Bell, S. (2007). Cold Terror. How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism around the World. Canada: John Wiley& Sons Ltd.

Bevölkerung- Entwicklung der Einwohnerzahl, 15.12.2014, http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/2861/umfrage/entwicklung-der-gesamtbevoelkerung-deutschlands.

Castells, M.(2010). The Power of Identity (Second Edition). Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

Chambers, I. (2001). Migrancy, Culture, Identity. London, New York: Routledge.

Danielson, M. N. (1976). The Politics of Exclusion. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dearden, L. (2014). Germany anti-Islam protests: biggest PEGIDA march ever in Dresden as the rest of Germany shows disgust with the lights out. The Independent, 05.01.2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-antiislam-protests-biggest-pegida-march-ever-in-dresden-as-rest-of-germany-shows-disgust-9959301.html.

Der vorbestrafte Kopf von PEGIDA. tagesschau.de, 15.12.2014, http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/lutz-bachmann-101.html.

Esman, R. A. (2014). Experts Warn More European Muslim Youth Are Radicalizing, 25.04.2014, http://www.investigativeproject.org/4362/experts-warn-more-european-muslim-youth-are#.

Faist, T. (2004). The Migration Security Nexus: International Migration and Security Before and After 9/11. Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations, 4/03. School of International Migration and Ethnic Relations, Malmö University.

Fakten zum Thema: Religion, 15.12.2014, http://de.statista.com/themen/125/religion/.

Finlayson, A. & Martin, J. (2006). Poststructuralism. In: Colin Hay, Michael Lister & David Marsh (Eds.), The State-Theories and Issues (pp. 155-171). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power. Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4, 777-795.

Giddens, A. (2009). Oraşele şi spaţiile urbane. Bucureşti: All.

Goldstone, A. J. (2012). A Theory of Political Demography. Human and Institutional Reproduction. In: Jack A. Goldstone, Eric P. Kaufmann & Monica Duffy Toft (Eds.), Political Demography. How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics (pp. 10-28). Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers.

Huntington, S. P. (2011). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon& Schuster Paperbacks.

Jones, A. (2011). Globalizarea: Teoreticieni fundamentali. Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing.

Kicinger, A. (2004). International Migration as a Non-Traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to This Phenomenon (Working Paper). Warsaw: Central European Forum for Migration Research

Mah, B. (2013). Voting Rights for Permanent Residents: Citizens Engagement or Citizenship Devaluation?, 29.05.2013, http://maytree.com/blog/2013/05/voting-rights-for-permanent-residents-citizen-engagement-or-citizenship-devaluation/.

Mansur, S. (2013). Islam and Islamism, 23.07.2013, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3865/islam-islamism.

Polizeidirektion Dresden. Medieninformation 456/2014, Dresden, 22.12. 2014, http://www.polizei.sachsen.de/de/medieninformationen_pdd.htm

Sassen, S. (2012). An Emergent Urban Geopolitics, OP-ED, 23.08.2012, http://www.saskiasassen.com

Statistik in Dresden, 22.12. 2014, http://statistik-dresden.de/archives/tag/einwohner.

Torny, M. (2014). Race, Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration. In: S. M. Bucerius & M. Torny (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration (pp. 1-17). New York: Oxford University Press.

Toronto Facts, 22.12. 2014, http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=57a12cc817453410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD.

UN (2014), More than half of the world's population now living in urban areas, UN survey finds, 10.07.2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48240#.VKAhZV4AA.

Weber, M. (1922). The city (non-legitimate domination). In Economy and Society (pp. 1212-1372). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wendt, A. (2011). Teoria socială a politicii internaţionale. Iaşi: Polirom.

Who goes to German PEGIDA anti-Islamization rallies. BBC, 12.01.2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30776182.

Zehntausende versammeln sich gegen PEGIDA. Die Zeit, 12.01.2015, http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-01/pegida-dresden-leipzig-legida-live-blog